The Exhaustion of Local Rule and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts by Yale-Loehr, Stephen W.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 13
Issue 2 Summer 1980 Article 9
The Exhaustion of Local Rule and Forum Non
Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S.
Courts
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yale-Loehr, Stephen W. (1981) "The Exhaustion of Local Rule and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts,"
Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol13/iss2/9
THE EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES RULE
AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS
A plaintiff may, after forum shopping, decide to bring suit in a foreign
rather than a local forum., If the foreign forum is improper, however, the
court may utilize one of two doctrines to dismiss the case back to the local
forum: forum non conveniens, developed in various countries' laws,2 or
exhaustion of local remedies, an international law doctrine.3 Both doc-
trines may be relevant, however, when national courts apply international
law standards to the merits of a particular controversy.4 While the two
1. For example, a plaintiff may suspect a local forum to be biased against its claim, or
unduly dominated by the executive branch. The plaintiff may feel that the foreign forum
offers greater procedural rights, or grants higher damage awards. See, e.g., MacShannon v.
Rockware Glass, Ltd., [1978] A.C. 795, 814. The statute of limitations may also be a factor.
2. See notes 82-109 infra and accompanying text. Forum non conveniens has been de-
fined as "the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction
whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere."
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1
(1929).
3. See notes 40-81 infra and accompanying text. Discussion of the doctrine here concen-
trates on exhaustion of judicial rather than legislative or administrative remedies. For cases
discussing the doctrine, see, for example, Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6, 26-29 (Third Pre-
liminary Objections); Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9,97-99; The Panevezys-
Saldutiskis Railway Case, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 76. An extensive body of literature
also exists. See, e.g., C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
95-102 (1928); A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF
JUSTICE 403-55 (1938); C. LAW, THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961)
(also contains an exhaustive bibliography); 2 LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS
312-13 (1956); Amerasinghe, The Exhaustion of Procedural Remedies in the Same Court, 12
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1285 (1963); Fawcett, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or
Procedure, [1954] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 452; luyomade, Dual Claim and the Exhaustion of
Local Remedies Rule in International Law, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1977); Mummery,
The Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial Remedies, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 389 (1964).
The local remedies rule does not apply when the international claim is based on a direct injury
to a state itself. A. FREEMAN, supra, at 404.
4. One commentator characterizes these types of cases as situations in which national
tribunals exercise "international jurisdiction." Brownlie, The Indiidual Before Tribunals Exer-
cising International Jurisdiction, I 1 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 701, 702 (1962). For a description of
the circumstances enabling a national court to apply international law, see text accompanying
notes 13-39 infra. See Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal
Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12-17 (1970). For limits on the types of cases in which the two
doctrines overlap, see notes 110-20 infra and accompanying text.
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rules are similar in many respects, the policy reasons behind each differ.5
Given the upsurge of interest in human rights, 6 international covenants
adopting the principle of individual petition,7 and the increased invocation
of statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1350,8 which allows individuals to sue for
international law violations, conflict between the two doctrines is likely to
occur.9 Filartiga v. Pena'o illustrates the potential conflict between the the-
ories. Two Paraguayan residents have sued another Paraguayan under 28
U.S.C. § 1350, a little-used statute granting aliens the right to sue in federal
district court for torts committed in violation of international law." l The
defendant moved to dismiss the action on a forum non conveniens motion,
but an exhaustion of local remedies defense is also plausible.' 2
5. For the policies underlying forum non conveniens, see text accompanying note 82
infra. For the purposes of the local remedies rule, see text accompanying notes 46-52 infra.
6. See, e.g., L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS V (1973).
7. See examples cited in Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in Interna-
tionalLaw, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 17 (1978).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." Shepard's lists only 37 federal decisions citing section 1350
and its predecessors in the 190 years since the statute's enactment in 1789 (through issue dated
May 1980). See also Note, The Law ofNations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction Over
Tort Claims by.41iens Under 28 U.S.C § 1350, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 71 (1977); Annot., 34
A.L.R. Fed. 388 (1977).
9. It should be noted that to date, no U.S. cases have discussed the two doctrines simul-
taneously. Future conflicts will most likely arise in § 1350 cases. See notes 13-39 inira and
accompanying text. Forum non conveniens has been asserted in two § 1350 cases: the issue
was not reached in Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976), because of a lack of the subject matter prerequisite; the second case is currently on
appeal. Filartiga v. Pena, No. 79-6090 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1979) (action dismissed), appeal
docketed, (2d Cir. June 4, 1979). The domestic remedies issue has not been addressed in any
section 1350 case.
10. Id.
11. The tort alleged in Filartiga is wrongful death by torture. Plaintiffs (decedent's father
and sister) allege that defendant's acts violated both customary international law and interna-
tional treaties and conventions. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Filartiga v. Pena, No. 79-
6090 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1979) (action dismissed), appeal docketed,(2d Cir. June 4, 1979) [here-
inafter cited as Appellants' Brief]; Joint Appendix to Filartiga v. Pena, No. 79-6090 (E.D.N.Y.
May 18, 1979) (action dismissed), appeal docketed, (2d Cir. June 4, 1979), at 4 [hereinafter
cited as Joint Appendix] (both documents on file at Cornell International Law Journal). Plain-
tiffs originally filed criminal murder charges against the defendant Pena in a Paraguayan
court, but the Paraguayan courts have stalled the action for three years. Appellants' Brief,
supra, at 6-7; Joint Appendix, supra, at 7. Pena fled Paraguay and was residing illegally in
Brooklyn when plaintiffs discovered him. Suit was brought in the Eastern District of New
York. Joint Appendix, supra, at 7, 18. The district court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, feeling bound by Second Circuit decisions that narrowly inter-
preted the scope of international law. Id. at 107-08.
12. Appellants' Brief, supra note 11, at 3; Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 47. The dis-
trict court did not address the forum non conveniens issue because of its ruling that plaintiffs
lacked the subject matter jurisdictional prerequisite. See note 11 supra. If the Second Circuit
LOCAL REMEDIES AND FNC
This Note examines the relationship between the two rules, concentrat-
ing on U.S. law, and attempts to resolve conflicts between them in a princi-
pled manner. First, the Note presents a brief overview of an individual's
ability to sue for international law violations in domestic courts. Then, it
sketches the respective characteristics of the exhaustion of domestic reme-
dies requirement and forum non conveniens. Finally, the Note describes
areas of conflict and proposes a modest solution.
ABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS TO SUE FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS: AN
OVERVIEW
A person's or corporation's ability to sue for international law viola-
tions in domestic courts depends upon authority conferred by one of three
sources: treaties,1 3 constitutions, I4 or specific statutory enactments.
Because individuals wishing to sue on international law claims in American
courts rarely invoke treaties or the Constitution,' 5 however, discussion is
limited to authority for such suits granted by the U.S. Code.
reverses and remands, however, the issue might be relevant. Defendant might also raise an
exhaustion of local remedies defense on remand. See text accompanying notes 45-57 infra.
13. In the Danzig Railway Officials Case, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 15, the Permanent
Court of International Justice stated: "[I]t cannot be disputed that the very object of an inter-
national agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption
by the Parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable
by the national courts." Id. at 17-18. The Court held that an agreement between Danzig and
Poland regulating employment conditions of officials taken into the Polish railway service
granted Danzig railway officials a right of action for purely pecuniary claims in Danzig courts
against the Polish Railway Administration. Id. at 26. See also Steiner & Gross v. Polish State,
4 Ann. Dig. 291 (Upper Silesian Arb. Trib. 1928), which held that article 4(2) of the German-
Polish Convention of May 15, 1922, conferred jurisdiction upon the Upper Silesian Arbitral
Tribunal to hear claims by individuals against States. Individuals could advance claims based
on articles 299, 300, and 365 of the Versailles Treaty, held a German court. I FONTES JUoIS
GENTIUM, ser. A, sec. 2, no. 398, at 21-22 (V. Burus ed. 1931). The Hague Convention of 1905
has been held to confer individual rights upon Russian nationals before Dutch courts. Wirbe-
laver v. de Handelsvennootschap onder de firma Lippmann Rosenthal en Co., 4 Ann. Dig. 59,
60 (D. Ct. of the Netherlands 1925). These examples mark the exceptions rather than the rule,
however. See Brownlie, The Place of the Individualin International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 435,
440 (1964) ("[i]n general, treaties do not create direct rights and obligations for private individ-
uals .. ").
14. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o define and punish... Offences
against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. In addition, the constitutions of the
German Federal Republic, Italy, Korea, and the Philippines incorporate the generally
accepted principles of international law into their domestic courts. See H. BRIGoS, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 58-59 (1952).
15. No cases interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 have discussed an individual's right
to sue under the law of nations. Moreover, federal courts have held that only self-executing
treaties grant individuals the power to enforce treaty rights. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
1980]
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Thirteen sections of the U.S. Code presently incorporate the "law of
nations." 1 6 Discussion of the phrase, however, has been limited to cases
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1350.17 Of thirty-seven cases mentioning section
1350, only two decisions sustained jurisdiction.' 8 This limitation of the
statute's application may be due to a shift from natural law theory to posi-
tivism in international law.
No legislative history exists for section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the predecessor of section 1350.19 "Natural law" philosophy, however, was
prevalent in Europe at the time.20 Emmerich de Vattel, a leading scholar of
the period, argued that individuals retained certain fundamental rights
against their sovereign, and thus could sue under international law. 2'
While the influence of natural law theory on the statute's authors is
unknown, the language of section 1350 suggests that Americans adopted the
right of individuals to sue for international law violations. 2 2 Other indirect
evidence leads to the same conclusion. For example, Representative John
Vining of Delaware argued in support of the Judiciary Act and section
1350's predecessor:
[h]e wished ... to see justice so equally distributed, as that every citizen of
the United States should be fairly dealt by, and so impartially administered,
that every subject or citizen of the world, whether foreigner or alien, friend or
foe, should be alike satisfied; by this means, the doors of justice would be
thrown wide open, emigration would be encouraged from all countries into
your own, and, in short, the United States of America would be made not
only an asylum of liberty, but a sanctuary of justice.23
24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 835 (1976). Few treaties have been accorded that
status. See generally Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, [1953]
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 756, 957, 967, 1651, 2274, 3058, 3185 (1976); 22 U.S.C. §§ 406,462(1976);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1350, 2241 (1976); 33 U.S.C. §§ 384, 385 (1976).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). See note 11 supra.
18. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). The most recent case is currently on appeal to
the Second Circuit. Filartiga v. Pena, No. 79-6090 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1979) (action dis-
missed), appeal docketed, (2d Cir. June 4, 1979).
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 67 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).
In IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit stated: "[Section
1350] is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act,
. . . no one seems to know whence it came."
20. Note, supra note 8, at 73-75.
21. See generally DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (rev. ed. London 1797).
22. Note, supra note 8, at 75-76. See also Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part ofthe
National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 48 (1952).
23. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 821 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834). See Dickinson, supra note
22, at 44-46.
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Given this context, one commentator argues that "it seems clear ... that
the drafters of the Judiciary Act contemplated the use of the federal courts
by individuals to enforce rights arising under international law."'24
Just six years after its enactment, an individual successfully sued
another individual under section 9 of the Judiciary Act. The court in
Bolchos v. Darre125 found subject matter jurisdiction under the United
States-France treaty, and restored to plaintiff his captured slaves. 26 The
defendant did not raise, and the court felt no need to discuss, any argument
that an individual could not sue for international law violations.
Positivism, however, triumphed over natural law theory as the domi-
nant legal philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 27
The positivists asserted that only states are subjects of international law.
Thus, individuals have no rights, except indirectly, through a state's discre-
tionary decision to take up a national's claim.28 Modern federal courts
interpreting section 1350 have tended toward a positivist view, thus restrict-
ing the statute's applicability. The general rule now is that:
[A] violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been "a viola-
tion by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a)
affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a for-
eign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in
dealings inter se."2 9
This definition effectively imposes a two-tier jurisdictional prerequisite on
section 1350 actions: actionable conduct must both constitute a tort involv-
ing an alien and violate a state's rights under international law. Further-
more, an individual cannot sue his own state under the section.30 Only
fortuitous facts can surmount such an onerous burden.
24. See Note, supra note 8, at 76.
25. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
26. Id.
27. A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 232 (1954); Svarlien,
International Law and the Individual, 4 J. PUB. L. 138, 140 (1955).
28. See W.P. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTER-
NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 23-44 (1966) (and authorities therein cited); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 175 (1965);
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438, 439-44 (1947); Lillich,
supra note 4, at 12-18; Note, supra note 8, at 77-78.
29. IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.
Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). See also Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
324,328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interanericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F.
Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
30. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d at 31 (dictum) ("violations of international law do not
occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state."). This rationale accords
with a positivist perspective. If individuals cannot sue in international law except through
their states, a fortiori, individuals have no rights to sue their own states. See text at note 28
supra.
19801
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It is not surprising, therefore, that only one decision in modem times
has held conduct actionable under section 1350. In Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Cl/ft,31 plaintiff alleged that his former wife had moved to the
United States to prevent him from taking lawful custody of their daughter
under Moslem law. He further alleged that his ex-wife had concealed their
daughter's name and Lebanese nationality by including the child in his
ex-wife's Iraqi passport. 32 The District Court for the District of Maryland
held that the defendant's refusal to deliver the daughter to her father consti-
tuted a tort,3 3 and that the mother's actions violated international law by
denying Lebanon the right "to control the issuance of passports to its
nationals."34 Only the coincidental combination of the falsified passport
with the alleged tort enabled the plaintiff to overcome the twin jurisdic-
tional barriers erected by the court.
In considering section 1350 actions, U.S. courts should abandon their
present strangling definitions of the "law of nations." Such interpretations
ignore the statute's original intent.35 Moreover, the clear language of sec-
tion 1350 grants aliens the right to sue other individuals or states for inter-
national law violations. In addition, the trend of international law appears
to be shifting in that direction, albeit slowly. A few modem commentators
have argued for a readoption of this position. 36 Further, witness the renas-
cent interest in natural law theory generally, 37 the incorporation of the prin-
ciple of individual petition in international covenants, 38 and case law
31. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
32. Id. at 860-62.
33. Id. at 862-63. The court's interpretation of "tort" for § 1350 purposes does not seem to
accord with the statutory language. Any harm to the plaintiff arose "not from a violation of
his rights under the law of nations, but rather under local 'norms' if at all." Note, supra note 8,
at 8 1. Subsequent decisions have recognized this distinction and required that the tort itself
violate international law. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d at 30 (seizure of property
not a tort that violates international law); lIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015 (stealing not part of
the law of nations); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d at 145 (fraud not violative of
international law). This requirement represents a more accurate interpretation of section
1350's language, but creates an even more difficult barrier for potential plaintiffs.
34. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. at 864-65.
35. See text at notes 22-24 supra.
36. See, e.g., W.P. GORMLEY, supra note 28, at 30; Note, supra note 8, at 82-86.
37. See, e.g., F. RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1975); Svarlien,
supra note 27, at 140; Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of International Law?, 34
U. CIN. L. REv. 340, 349 (1965).
38. W.P. GORMLEY, supra note 28, discusses numerous examples: the Central American
Court of Justice, id. at 33; the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, id. at 37-38; the U.N.
Commission of Human Rights, id. at 51-52; the European Convention on Human Rights, id. at
76-82; the European Commission of Human Rights, id. at 92-107; the European Coal and
Steel Community Treaty, id. at 148-56; and the European Economic Community Tribunal, id.
at 168-77.
LOCAL REMEDIES AND FNC
developing that right.3 9 A clear opportunity exists for federal courts to
broaden an individual's ability to allege international tort violations under
section 1350.
II
THE EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES RULE
A. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO SECTION 1350 SUITS
The International Court of Justice has noted that "the rule that local
remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be insti-
tuted is a well-established rule of customary international law."'40 In the
Ambatielos Case,4 ' the arbitrators formulated the rule as follows:
[The local remedies rule] means that the State against which an international
action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals has the right to
resist such an action if the persons alleged to have been injured have not first
exhausted all the remedies available to them under the municipal law of that
State. The defendant State has the right to demand that full advantage shall
have been taken of all local remedies .... 42
The exhaustion of local remedies doctrine evolved under a positivist
interpretation of international law.4 3 Consequently, the policy reasons for
the rule focus on cases involving state X suing state Y for an injury inflicted
on state A's national by state Y. Most definitions of the local remedies
doctrine explicitly frame the rule in those terms.44 With the recent develop-
ment of individual rights in international law,45 the question arises whether
the local remedies requirement should also apply to an individual alleging
an international law violation against either his own state or another indi-
vidual. Though no U.S. court has discussed the domestic remedies require-
ment in deciding a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the requirement
should apply to such suits as well.
First, the policy reasons for the rule apply to individual suits. Among
the reasons cited as justification for the traditional domestic remedies rule
are the following:
39. See cases cited in W.P. GORMLEY, supra note 28, at 58 nn.54, 112-14, 148-58, 160-64,
168-77.
40. Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6, 27.
States may also agree to waive the rule. See, e.g., General Claims Convention, Sept. 8, 1923,
United States-Mexico, art. V, 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. No. 678. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209 (1965).
41. Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom), 23 I.L.R. 306 (Arb. Comm. 1956).
42. Id. at 334.
43. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., C. LAW, supra note 3, at 37; Iluyomade, supra note 3, at 83-84.
45. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
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1. "[T]he local remedies rule reconciles national autonomy with interna-
tional co-operation in the sense that each state accepts, in broad lines,
the judicial remedies provided by other states, and yet this acceptance
does not deny the importance of proper international settlement of a
dispute and the international standard of justice."46
2. The rule may relieve international tribunals of excessive litigation bur-
dens. 47
3. The rule saves both the complainant and respondent the heavy
expenses of an initial international adjudication.48
4. The rule benefits the respondent by avoiding the undue publicity of an
international proceeding that may exacerbate the problem and aggra-
vate international relations.4 9
5. National courts, familiar with local, conditions and possessing easy
access to witnesses, can usually settle disputes more expeditiously and
conveniently than international tribunals.5 0
6. The rule avoids unnecessary multiplication of small claims brought by
states invoking the doctrine of diplomatic protection.5'
7. The rule allows the defendant an opportunity to amend the wrong.5 2
46. C. LAW, supra note 3, at 19. See C. EAGLETON, supra note 3, at 100; A. FREEMAN,
supra note 3, at 417.
47. Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 1288. To illustrate the problem, individuals registered a
total of 8,448 individual applications with the European Commission of Human Rights
between 1955 and 1978. The Commission received 644 individual applications in 1972 alone.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (1979). This reason, however, does not apply to the under-
utilized International Court of Justice.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 206, Comment a (1965); Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 1289.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 206, Comment a (1965); Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 1289; Mummery, supra note 3, at 391.
50. See E. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 817 (1928);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206, Com-
ment a (1965).
51. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (1966). The doctrine
of diplomatic protection limits a state's treatment of aliens by providing that a state, on behalf
of its national, may sue another state for a violation of international law inflicted upon the
individual by the other state. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 276, 283-84 (6th ed.
1963).
52. Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. at 27; Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. at 97;
Finnish Vessels Case (Finland v. Great Britain), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1484, 1502 (1934); A.
FREEMAN, supra note 3, at 416; Trindade, Denial of Justice and Its Relationship to Exhaustion
ofLocal Remedies in International La, 53 PHILIPPINE L.J. 404, 417 (1978); Editorial Com-
ment, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 718, 729-36 (1934).
Some of the same rationales behind the local remedies requirement also underlie the forum
non conveniens doctrine. See notes 47 & 50 supra and accompanying text. For discussion of
the factors courts consider in forum non conveniens analysis, see text accompanying notes 83-
109 infra;, for discussion of the two policies' similarities, see notes 126-27 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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These policies, though couched in terms of an international forum, are
just as important in the context of a section 1350 suit. If, as urged above,53
federal courts follow the statute's original intent and broaden an individ-
ual's ability to sue other individuals, the doctrine provides necessary safe-
guards. Recognition of the exhaustion of local remedies requirement will
prevent vexatious litigation in which the United States has little or no inter-
est. By accepting the rule, the United States will recognize the remedies of
the other state. Further, without the rule in section 1350 cases, relations
between the United States and the other state may become strained, while,
with the rule, the state has the opportunity to correct the problem with a
minimum of international interference. Because the policy reasons apply,
so should the rule.
Second, an analogy can be drawn to the European Convention on
Human Rights, especially in the area of suits by individuals against states.
The Convention allows individual petitions against any party to the Con-
vention, including an individual's own state.54 However, the Convention
still requires exhaustion of local remedies.55 One commentator noted that
53. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
54. Article 25(l) provides: "The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Sec-
retary-General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention .. " Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. CONy.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 1-18 (9th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited without cross
reference as COLLECTED TEXTS].
The European Convention provides for creation of a commission and court to implement its
guarantees. Id. arts. 19-26, COLLECTED TEXTS at 6-8. Complaints are sent first to the
Commission, id. arts. 24 & 27, COLLECTED TEXTS at 8, which attempts to arbitrate an amicable
settlement. If no such settlement occurs, the Commission may determine whether there has
been a breach of the Convention, and report its findings to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe together with its recommendations. Id. art. 31, COLLECTED TEXTS at 9.
The Committee can then legally bind parties to the Convention through its decisions. Id. art.
32, COLLECTED TEXTS at 9. The Commission may file a complaint with the European Court
of Human Rights. Id. art. 48, COLLECTED TEXTS at 11.
55. Art. 26 requires that as to individual applications, "[t]he Commission may only deal
with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognized rules of international law." European Convention, supra note 54, art. 8, CoL-
LECTED TEXTS at 8.
For discussion of art. 26, see R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 60-72 (1973); J.
FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 288-304
(1969). For cases arising under the European Convention that discuss the local remedies rule,
see, for example, Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 4 DECISIONS AND REPORTS 4,87 (Eur. Comm.
of Human Rights 1976) (final decision on admissibility) [hereinafter cited as 4 DECISIONS AND
REP.]; Greek Case, [1969] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 194 (Eur. Comm. of Human
Rights).
For application of the local remedies requirement to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, see case excerpts in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 6, at 1341-42,
1347-54. See also E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. IA) U.N. Doc. E/4832/
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"the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is a large and necessary limi-
tation on the competence of the Convention bodies to deal with alleged
breaches. . . . [1]t can hardly be imagined that the principle of individual
petition would have been accepted without [the requirement]." 56 The rea-
sons for this continued requirement appear clear-all of the traditional
rationales supporting the concept of a domestic remedies rule when one
state sues another state on behalf of an individual apply with equal vigor to
individuals suing states directly.57
B. ExCEPTIONS TO THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE
.  Traditional Exceptions
Traditionally, a court will waive the local remedies rule if the plaintiff
proves a lack of effective remedies in the particular case.58 To determine
the effectiveness of the remedy, courts consider the following factors:
Add.1 (1970) (Human Rights Commission may investigate alleged human rights violations
only if "[a]ll available means at the national level have been resorted to and exhausted."),
reprinted in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 6, at 841-43.
56. J. FAWCETr, supra note 54, at 288.
57. See text at notes 46-52 supra.
58. "[Iun accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law, the
exhaustion of a domestic remedy is nevertheless not required if the applicant party can prove
that in the particular circumstances such remedy will probably prove ineffectual or inade-
quate." Application No. 299/57, Greece v. United Kingdom (Second Cyprus Case), [1958-
1959] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 186, 192-94 (Eur. Comm. of Human Rights) (deci-
sion on admissibility of October 12, 1957). See Judge Lauterpacht's comment in the Norwe-
gian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. at 39 ("[International tribunals] have refused to act upon [the
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies] in cases in which there are, in fact, no effective
remedies available owing to the law of the State concerned or the conditions prevailing in it.")
(separate opinion).
Courts vary in the standard they apply to determine ineffectiveness. Some opinions adopt a
strict approach, requiring that a claimant prove that the local remedy in question is "obyiously
futile" to escape operation on the rule. Finnish Vessels Case (Finland v. Great Britain), 3 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1484, 1504 (emphasis added). The Finnish Vessels arbitrator relied on
Borchard for the distinction between futile and "obviously futile." Borchard states:
In a few prize cases, it has been held that in face of a uniform course of decisions in
the highest courts, a reversal of the condemnation being hopeless, an appeal was ex-
cused; but this rule was most strictly construed, and if substantial right of appeal ex-
isted, failure to prosecute an appeal operated as a bar to relief.
E. BORCHARD, supra note 50, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted). See also Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Ry. Case, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, at 18-19; X v. Gov't of Sweden, (Application No. 434/58),
[1958-1959] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 354, 374 (Eur. Comm. of Human Rights);
Mummery, supra note 3, at 398-400.
Other authorities follow a more flexible approach. See, e.g., Panevezys-Saldutiskis Ry.
Case, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, at 48 ("In each case account is to be taken of the circumstances
surrounding the means of redress.") (Hudson, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 208(a) (1965).
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undue delay, 59 the presence of bias in local courts,60 and repetition of the
same wrong.6 1
Besides ineffectiveness of local remedies, waiver of the requirement
may occur in certain other situations. For example, where no domestic
remedy for the alleged wrong exists (e.g., the alleged act violates interna-
tional, but not local law), the rule does not apply.62 Similarly, a prior deter-
mination by the highest court of the state on substantially identical claims
voids application of the rule.63 Finally, where the claimant's state asserts a
separate claim on its own behalf for direct injury to it arising out of the
same wrongful conduct, the individual is excused from pursuing local reme-
dies.64
2. 'dministrafiye Practice" Exception
The European Commission of Human Rights has developed an
"administrative practice" exception to the local remedies rule in torture
cases.65 If an applicant can prove both a substantial number of acts of tor-
ture indicating a general practice, and official tolerance by high ranking
state officials, 66 and the respondent state then fails to demonstrate the
actual effectiveness of local remedies, the Commission will waive the local
remedies requirement. 67 The European Court of Human Rights adopted
59. El Oro Mining & Ry. Co., Ltd. (Great Britain v. Mexico), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 191,
198 (1931) (delay of nine years held to waive local remedies requirement).
60. See Brown Case (United States v. Great Britain), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 120, 129
(1923) (domestic remedies not required when executive branch dominates judiciary). Seealso
C. LAW, supra note 3, at 68; Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 1313.
61. See C. LAW, supra note 3, at 70-71.
62. See Fawcett, supra note 3, at 455.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 208(b) (1965).
64. Id. § 208(c).
65. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture and degrad-
ing treatment or punishment. European Convention, supra note 54, art. 3, COLLECTED TExTs
at 3. Article 26 requires exhaustion of local remedies for individual applications. See note 55
supra. The Commission formulated the "administrative practices" exception to article 26 out
of a concern that, where a practice of torture or ill treatment exists, local remedies "would tend
to be rendered ineffective by the difficulty of securing probative evidence, and administrative
enquiries would either not be instituted, or, if they were, would be likely to be half-hearted and
incomplete." Greek Case, [1969] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 194. See Ireland
v. United Kingdom, [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512, 754 (Eur. Comm. of
Human Rights) (citing Greek Case, [1969] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 195-96).
66. In evaluating the "tolerance" prong of its test, the Commission focuses on the local
judiciary's effectiveness in providing remedies. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 4DECISIONS AND RaP., supra note 55, at 87. See also notes 69-73 infra and accompanying text.
67. For discussion of the confusion surrounding the Commission's test, see Boyle & Han-
num, The Donnely Case, Administrative Practice and Domestic Remedies Under the European
Convention: One Step Forwardand Two Steps Back, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1977); McGovern,
The Local Remedies Rule and Administrative Practices in the European Convention on Human
1980]
362 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:351
this concept, but seems to require only proof of repetition of acts to exempt
an applicant. 68
The Commission's two-tier test seems more reasonable. Proof of
numerous acts of torture does not necessarily indicate that courts will be
unwilling to compensate victims, or that high level officials tolerate the
practice. Donnely v. United Kingdom 69 provides a good example. In
Donnelly, seven individuals complained to the European Commission of
Human Rights that the police or members of the British Army tortured
each of the seven, in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention, and
that this ill-treatment was part of an administrative practice that permitted
and encouraged brutality.70 The Commission, however, found that the le-
gal machinery for providing compensation had operated effectively for four
of the seven applicants, 7 1 and that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that
the Northern Ireland judiciary generally was ineffective in policing alleged
violations. Statistics support the Commission's latter conclusion.72 Thus,
even accepting arguendo the applicants' contention that (1) repeated ill-
treatment of terrorist suspects occurred, and (2) immediate supervisors of
those responsible tolerated the ill-treatment, the Commission declared their
application inadmissible for nonexhaustion of local remedies.73 Both the
Rights, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 119 (1975); O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
674, 691 (1977).
For an example of a case where the state successfully met its burden of demonstrating the
actual effectiveness of local remedies, see Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 4 DECISIONS AND
REP., supra note 55, at 4.
68. The Court has collapsed the Commission's two-tier test by presuming official tolerance
once the Court finds an "accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are suffi-
ciently numerous and inter-connected to amount ... to a pattern or system. . . ." Ireland v.
United Kingdom, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 680, 701 (1978). See also Klayman, The Definition of Torture in International Law,
51 TEMPLE L.Q. 449, 510 (1978).
69. 4 DECISIONS AND REP., supra note 55, at 4.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Id. at77.
72. Id. at 48. For example, between August 9, 1971 and September 30, 1978, 798 tort
actions alleging assaults by the security forces were commenced in Northern Ireland, of which
222 cases were settled out of court for damages totalling £420,000. Id.
73. The Commission expressly distinguished tolerance by immediate supervisors from
that authorized at high levels of government. Only the latter satisfies the second factor:
[I]t has not been established that any ill-treatment which the present applicants may
have suffered was condoned or tolerated by persons in authority other than those
directly involved with the applicants at the relevant times .... The fact that ill-treat-
ment may be tolerated, at the middle or lower levels of the chain of command, for
example at the level of an officer in charge of a police station of [sic] military post,
does not in the opinion of the Commission necessarily mean that the state concerned
has failed to take the required steps to comply with its substantive obligations under
Art. 3 of the Convention. Existing remedies which provide redress for the individual
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Court's and the Commission's tests are adequate for cases involving coun-
tries in which a small ruling order controls both the torturers and judiciary.
For nations with genuine separation of powers, however, the Commission's
formula more often achieves a just result.
The "administrative practice" exception might profitably be extended
to other fundamental human rights areas. Although commentators argue
over the scope of "fundamental human rights," 74 rights such as racial
equality and the political equality of women, already effectuated by inter-
national conventions, arguably constitute basic human values.75 Suppose,
for example, that article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice were amended to include the right of individual petition,76 and a black
South African leader subsequently brought charges against his own govern-
ment before the World Court, alleging a breach of article 3 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, condemning apartheid.77 Suppose further that the appli-
cant produced evidence that the South Africian government endorses
apartheid at all levels, including the judiciary, and practices it against all
blacks. Aside from the question whether a nonparty to such a convention
may nevertheless be held to that convention's standards through customary
international law,78 no sound policy exists to justify forcing the South Afri-
victims of ill-treatment are not therefore necessarily rendered inadequate in such a
situation.
Id. at 84-85. Four applicants accepted out-of-court settlements ranging from £300 to £6,000.
The Commission denied those four applications on the ground that they had received compen-
sation in satisfaction of their claims. Id. at 87. See also Boyle & Hannum, supra note 67, at
319.
74. See, e.g., McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Princoles of Content and
Procedurefor Clarifying General Community Policies 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387 (1974); McDougal,
Laswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented
Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L J. 237 (1969).
75. See Convention on the Political Rights of Women, openedfor signature Mar. 31, 1953,
27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (U.S. accession, Apr. 8, 1976); Interna-
tional Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signa-
ture Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (U.S. signature, Sept. 28, 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Convention on Racial Discrimination]. See also W.P. GORMLEY, supra note 28, at 24.
76. Article 34 presently provides in pertinent part that "[o]nly states may be parties in
cases before the Court." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, 59 Stat 1055, T.S.
No. 993 (1945).
77. Article 3 provides: "States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and
apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in terri-
tories under their jurisdiction." Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 75, art. 3
(emphasis in original).
78. The Hague Conventions on rules of land warfare are considered to be binding on non-
parties. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 10,500. One commentator has asserted that the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may bind non-signatories who are members of
the United Nations, because of the Covenant's dual status as both convention and U.N. resolu-
tion. Bassiouni, An Appraisal of Torture in International Law and Practice: The Needfor an
19801
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can to pursue local remedies. In this situation, a sensible solution would be
to apply the European Commission's test and allow, as a rebuttable pre-
sumption, waiver of the local remedies rule.
Assuming expansion of the "administrative practice" exception from
torture to other fundamental human rights, the Commission's two-prong
test provides more realistic limitations than the European Court's test. Sup-
pose a racial minority leader sued the U.S. government in an international
tribunal that allowed individual petition, alleging a violation of article 2(a)
of the Convention on Racial Discrimination. 79 If the European Court's
"single factor test" were adopted, the international court might well waive
the domestic remedies requirement merely upon a showing of a series of
discriminatory acts practiced against members of racial minorities in their
public lives.80 Numerous cases exist, however, demonstrating the willing-
ness of U.S. courts to intervene in this area.8 ' Because U.S. courts would
allow the plaintiff an adequate remedy, no reason exists to waive the local
remedies rule in this situation.
III
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Four general purposes underlie the forum non conveniens doctrine:
(1) to discourage vexatious litigation; (2) to best serve the convenience of
the parties; (3) to serve the court's convenience; and (4) to serve "the ends of
justice. '8 2 To implement these goals, the U.S. Supreme Court considers the
International Conventionfor the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, 48 REVUE INTERNATIO-
NALE DE DROIT PENAL 68 (1977). For an extensive analysis along these lines as to torture, see
Klayman, note 68 supra. This argument may be particularly forceful for racial discrimination,
since over 100 nations have adhered to the Convention on Racial Discrimination, note 75
supra. Status of International Conventions in the Field of Human Rights in Respect of Which the
Secretary-General Performs Depositary Sanctions, U.N. Doc. A/33/143 (1978). See generally
C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
79. Article 2(a) provides that "[e]very State Party undertakes not to engage in any act or
practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups or persons or institutions and to
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in con-
formity with this obligation." Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 75, art. 2(a).
80. The plaintiff would, of course, have to clear the same significant hurdles as in the
South African hypothetical, text accompanying notes 76-78 supra, even to reach the waiver
question.
81. See e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1954); Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1302 (1962); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1512 (1941).
82. For American cases discussing these purposes, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 507 (1947); Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 426 (3rd Cir. 1970); Mobil Tankers Co.
v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
English decisions have traditionally focused on serving justice. See, e.g., St. Pierre v. South
American Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd., [1936] 1 K.B. 382, 398 ("In order to justify a stay
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following factors when deciding whether to dismiss a case on forum non
conveniens: (1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) relative ease of access
to sources of proof; (3) availability and cost of witnesses; (4) the
enforcibility ofjudgment; (5) procedural barriers to a fair trial; (6) adminis-
trative convenience for the court; and (7) possible difficulties in applying
law foreign to the forum. 83 A recent decision by the English House of
Lords discusses similar factors. 84 Actual application of these factors, and
attainment of these goals, however, varies both domestically and interna-
tionally.
First, in suits involving some international aspect, American courts
vary in their emphasis on one or another of these goals.85 For example, in
Hoffman v. Goberman,8 6 the Third Circuit relied on only two purposes:
"the ultimate inquiry is whether the retention of jurisdiction by the district
court would fairly serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of jus-
tice."837 To implement these goals, the court set forth a two-prong test for a
successful forum non conveniens motion, but both alternatives stressed con-
venience, not justice.8 8 A decision four years earlier by the same court,
: . * the defendant must satisfy the court that the continuance of the action would work an
injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him. . . and. . . the stay must not
cause an injustice to the plaintiff."); Logan v. Bank of Scotland (No. 2), [1906] 1 K.B. 141;
Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 Ch. D. 225 (1892); McHenry v. Lewis, 21 Ch. D. 202,22
Ch. D. 397 (C.A. 1891). In a recent decision, however, the House of Lords has expanded
consideration of the doctrine to include all four purposes. See MacShannon v. Rockware
Glass Ltd., [1978] A.C. 795, 812-14.
Scottish courts emphasize the "justice" goal underlying the forum non conveniens doctrine.
See, e.g,La Soci6t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Socidt6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs
Franqais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13, 22 ("The object. . . is to find thatforum which is the
more suitable for the ends ofjustice, and is preferable because pursuit of the litigation in that
forum is more likely to secure those ends.") (emphasis in original); Clements v. Macaulay, 44
Sess. Cas. (3d Ser.) 583 (1866). See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
35 CAL. L. REy. 380, 387-89 (1947); Blair, note 2 supra.
83. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
84. MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., [19781 A.C. 795, 812-14, 829.
85. See generally Note, The Convenient Forum AbroadRevisted" A Decade ofDevelopment
of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17
VA. J. INT'L L. 755, 764-77 (1977).
86. 420 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1970).
87. Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
88. The court's test required that, for a successful forum non conveniens motion,
[t]here must be a clear showing of facts which either (1) establish such oppression and
vexation of a defendant as to be out of all proportion to the plaintifrs convenience,
which may be shown to be slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial in the chosen forum
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and
legal problems.
Id. at 426-27 (footnote omitted). For a confusing, disjunctive interpretation of this test, see
Paper Operations Consultants International, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 671-
73 (9th Cir. 1975). See Note, supra note 85, at 765.
366 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:351
however, emphasized "serv[ing] the ends of justice." 89 Numerous other
decisions also incorporate this purpose, often to the exclusion of the other
goals. 90 Convenience to the court is a further complicating factor. As
docket congestion increases, this goal may well become more important.9 1
In this maze of indeterminate balancing of qualitative values, federal
courts often do not explicitly acknowledge a critical factor-citizenship of
the litigants. In Swft & Company Packers v. Compania Colombiana del
Caribe, S.A., the Supreme Court stated that "[a]pplication of forum non
conveniens principles to a suit by a United States citizen against a foreign
respondent brings into force considerations very different from those in
suits between foreigners." 92 The Court implied that it would grant forum
non conveniens motions less freely when an American citizen is a party to
the case.93 Lower court decisions show that this implication may actually
be the rule. Prior to 1970, there were "no reported cases . . . in which an
American plaintiff, suing in his own right, was actually relegated to a court
in a foreign country" through a successful forum non conveniens motion.94
89. "The issue of convenience aside, the more important question is whether the relin-
quishment of jurisdiction would best serve the ends of justice." Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene
Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966). The court
denied a forum non conveniens motion because it would force the libelants into "a foreign
forum in which the procedural remedies are far less conducive to the fair administration of
justice than those available under [U.S.] admiralty rules." Id.
90. See, e.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 367 (1885) (admiralty courts are to exercise
jurisdiction of cases between foreigners "unless special circumstances exist to show that justice
would be better subserved by declining it."); Poseidion Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno,
474 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1973), vacating 335 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Ga. 1972) ("The standard
for a federal court to use in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction in an in rem libel
involving foreign vessels. . . is, therefore, that the court should exercise its jurisdiction unless
the defendant can establish that to do so would work an injustice."); Zouras v. Menelaus Ship-
ping Co., 336 F.2d 209, 211 (1st Cir. 1964) ("[T]he court will not take cognizance of the case if
justice would be as well done by remitting the parties to their home forum.") (citation omit-
ted); Motor Distributors v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) ("[The rule is. . . that jurisdiction should be taken unless to do so
would work an injustice."); Fillippou v. Italia Societa Per Azioni di Navizione, 254 F. Supp.
162, 163 (D. Mass. 1966) ("[J]ustice may as well be done by remitting the plaintiff to a more
appropriate forum."); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. The Ciudad de la Habana,
181 F. Supp. 301, 311 (D. Md. 1960) ("[I]t is very doubtful whether Libellant can hope to
receive justice in Cuba. That is the dominant factor to be considered."). These decisions indi-
cate that even for courts adopting a 'justice" standard for their forum non conveniens determi-
nations, variation exists as to whether to apply this test impartially, or to skew it by assuming
that justice requires the exercise of jurisdiction in the present forum.
91. Note, supra note 85, at 766. See also Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 445, 453 (D. Del. 1978) ("Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin.").
92. 339 U.S. 684, 697 (1950).
93. See id. at 697-98. See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Lloyd Brasiliero Patrimonio Nacional,
85 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
94. 7 TEx. IN-t'L L.J. 513, 514 (1972) (footnotes omitted). The author of Note, supra note
85, remarked that the commentator in 7 TEX. INT'L L.J., supra, "qualified this statement with
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While a few recent decisions have eroded this absolute position 95 (further
compounding confusion surrounding application of the doctrine), federal
courts will normally deny a forum non conveniens motion asserted against
a U.S. plaintiff.96 Even where an American defendant has requested trans-
fer to an alternate forum, federal courts have denied the motion in about
half the cases. 9 7 Conversely, in over half the cases between aliens or for-
eign corporations, U.S. courts have granted forum non conveniens dismis-
sals.98
Other than the parties' citizenship, analysis of U.S. federal courts' deci-
sions reveals no guiding principles by which to evaluate forum non con-
veniens determinations. Courts often merely state their holdings with little
or no analysis.99 The fairness factors courts cite have not been applied with
uniformity. Thirty-five years ago, one commentator remarked that the
the phrase 'outside of admiralty,' but cited no admiralty case in which a U.S. plaintiff had been
subject to a [forum non conveniens] dismissal in favor of a foreign forum." Note, supra note
85, at 799 n.150.
95. See Mizokami Bros. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1035 (1978); Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Astro Exito Navegacion, S.A., 437 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bernuth Lembcke Co. v. Siemans A.G., [1976] Am. Mar. Cas. 2175
(S.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, No. 76-7512 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 1976); Mohr v. Allen, 407 F. Supp.
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408
(N.D. Ill. 1972). See Note, supra note 85, at 782-90 for discussion of these cases and the recent
trend.
96. Note, supra note 85, at 781. See also Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 428 (3d
Cir. 1970) (federal courts will follow an American plaintiff's election of a forum unless "per-
suasive evidence" exists that "the retention of jurisdiction will result in manifest injustice to
the defendant") (footnote omitted); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611,
614 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 945 (1966). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 352, 397-
411, 433-36 (1972).
97. This figure is compiled from cases presented in Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 352, 408-11,
433-36 (1972) and Note, supra note 85, at 778-79. See, e.g., Escalante v. Fernandez, No. 77-
1624-Civ. (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1977); Kearney v. Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc., 350 F. Supp.
85 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Alegria v. Grand Bassa Tankers, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Fiorenza v. United States Steel Int'l, Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Argyll Shipping
Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (one U.S. and seven Japanese
defendants); Karakatsanis v. Conquestador Cia. Nay., S.A., 247 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Lascaratos v. S/T Olympic Flame, 227 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders
Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Burie v. Overseas Navigation Corp., 205 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afdmem., 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 904
(1964); Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 141 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Linea de Vapores
Garcia, S.A. v. The President Polk, 89 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
98. See Note, supra note 85, at 764-77; Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 352, 411-31 (1972). See
also Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1967).
99. See, e.g., Kapatsos v. M/V Barlby, 238 F. Supp. 654, 655 (E.D. La. 1965) (justice best
served by dismissal); Transcontinental Commodities, Inc. v. Italnavi Societa di Navigazione
per Azioni-Genova, 175 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (court dismissed forum non con-
veniens motion in one sentence); Gonzales v. Dampskslsk Dania A.S. The Danvig, 108 F.
Supp. 908, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (justice not necessarily best served by dismissal; defendant's
motion denied); Lunde v. Skibs A.S. Herstein, 103 F. Supp. 446, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court
dismissed claims for maintenance and cure on forum non conveniens motion in two
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admiralty courts' application of forum non conveniens "has been much like
that of the proverbial Topsy,"100 and decried the paucity of reasoned analy-
sis.101 The intervening years, with their increase of international litigation,
have only seen analysis of the doctrine whirl more confusedly than ever.10 2
Second, although some European law contains analogues to forum non
conveniens, 10 3 the concept varies among nations.' 0 4 This inconsistency will
lead to dissimilar results on a motion for the court's discretionary dismissal
of a case, depending on the country the plaintiff sues in and the national-
ities of the litigants. For example, if an English citizen sued a citizen of
state X in an English court, dismissal to state X would be unlikely because
English courts impose a heavy burden on the defendant to establish that
injustice would result from trial in English courts.105 In addition, English
courts traditionally prefer English plaintiffs.'0 6 By contrast, American
courts tend to grant forum non conveniens dismissals in cases between
aliens. 10 7 Thus, a U.S. court deciding the same hypothetical case under 28
U.S.C. § 1350 might well subject the English plaintiff to a foreign forum.
This incentive to forum shop among nations adds to the previously
mentioned problems of confused application of the forum non conveniens
doctrine within a country.' 0 8 The former problem appears even more diffi-
cult to resolve than the latter. Combined, these factors argue against the
sentences); Linea de Vapores Garcia, S.A. v. The President Polk, 89 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y.
1950) (court denied forum non conveniens motion with a one sentence convenience argument).
100. Bickel, The Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens asAppliedin the Federal Courts in Mat-
ters of Admiralty. An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 19
(1949).
101. Id. at 47.
102. See Note, supra note 85, at 791.
103. The origins of the doctrine are obscure. Barrett, supra note 82, at 386 & n.34. The
concept appears limited to Europe and the United States, however. 56 HARV. L. REV. 1162
(1943).
104. For a discussion of Scottish law, see note 82 supra. See also Comment, Foreign Col-
lisions and Forum Convenens, 22 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 748, 752-53 (1973).
The term forum non conveniens is unknown in English law, and the House of Lords has
stated in a recent case that the relevant English law has developed differently from comparable
Scottish and American law. The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436, 454, 456, 464. While tradition-
ally, English courts refused to stay proceedings to a foreign forum unless the action's continu-
ance in England would work an "oppressive or vexatious" injustice upon the defendant, see
note 82 supra, a 1978 House of Lords decision indicated a more liberal attitude toward
allowing stays to foreign fora. MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., [1978] A.C. 795. The
court, however, refused to adopt the Scottish concept of forum non conveniens wholesale into
English law. Id. at 811, 817.
105. See note 82 supra.
106. See, e.g., Lord Keith's consideration in MacShannon of the plaintiffs place of resi-
dence, implying a greater tendency to continue an action when the plaintiff is an English citi-
zen and therefore in a "natural" forum. [1978] A.C. at 829.
107. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.
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use of the forum non conveniens doctrine in cases involving international
claims. 109
IV
CONFLICTS BETWEEN DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND
FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN SECTION
1350 ACTIONS
A. CATEGORIES OF CONFLICTS
The rules of forum non conveniens and exhaustion of local remedies
may conffict in a section 1350 action in two circumstances.'1 0 First, an
alien might sue a government in federal court for an alleged tort violation
of international law." ' I If the U.S. Government is the defendant, conffict
between the two doctrines is unlikely. The federal court hearing the action
is the most convenient forum, and its remedies are the local remedies.
Where a foreign government is the defendant, the act of state doctrine,112
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act," t3 and lack of a sufficient connec-
tion with the U.S. forum under Shaffer v. Heitner''a would all normally
109. See text accompanying notes 122-36 infra.
One judge has argued that the efitire forum non conveniens concept should be reexamined
in light of: (I) escalating claims versus relatively inexpensive travel costs to fly witnesses to the
forum, wherever located; (2) the growth of multinational subsidiaries; and (3) the trend toward
handling international cases primarily by deposition, especially in admiralty. Fitzgerald v.
Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 456 & nn.2-3 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
110. Conflict between the two doctrines might theoretically arise in two other situations: a
state suing a state, or a state suing an individual. Only alien individual or corporate plaintiffs
have jurisdiction under section 1350, however. Thus, the statute automatically preempts con-
sideration of cases involving a foreign state as plaintiff.
11. An example of this situation would be a hypothetical variation of Filartiga, discussed
at notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text, whereby the plaintiffs sued the Paraguayan gov-
ernment instead of a private individual. See also Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390
(D.D.C. 1958) (action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 by both American citizens and non-
resident aliens to enjoin U.S. Government from detonating nuclear weapons in the Marshall
Islands), afJ'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
112. The act of state doctrine assumes that domestic courts are unsuitable tribunals to
resolve international conflicts and states that judicial deference will be accorded to an act of
state taken by a recognized foreign government within its own territory, even though the for-
eign government's act may violate customary international law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); See also Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: International
Consensus and Public Policy Considerations 8 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 283 (1975).
113. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1980). The Act grants foreign states immunity
from jurisdiction in U.S. courts, with certain limited exceptions (primarily concerning a gov-
ernment's commercial activities).
114. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court rejected attachment of property as the sole basis for
quasi in rem jurisdiction and adopted the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 433 U.S. at 212. Thus, attaching a foreign government's
U.S. assets would not necessarily enable a plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign gov-
ernment.
370 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:351
justify dismissal of the case and thus pretermit consideration of either fo-
rum non conveniens or the local remedies requirement."I5
The two doctrines are most likely to collide in the second category of
cases-one individual suing a corporation or individual in a domestic court
on an international law claim. Consider Fiartiga.1t6 Because federal
courts lacked a principled analysis, defendant's forum non conveniens
motion to dismiss may be granted or denied, depending on the factors em-
phasized. Consideration of the procedural and substantive barriers to a fair
trial in Paraguay argues for continuation of the action in the United
States." 17 A majority of the other 6uf Oil factors, however, point toward
dismissal to Paraguay. Access to sources of proof and availability of wit-
nesses are both easier in Paraguay, that state has an interest in deciding
localized controversies at home, and dismissal is more convenient for the
U.S. court." 8 Finally, as a practical matter, federal courts have granted
forum non conveniens dismissals in over half the reported cases between
aliens.1 9 The Eastern District of New York, on remand, may well decide
similarly.
Conversely, if the court decided to apply exhaustion of local remedies
analysis it would retain the action in the United States. Proof of bias in the
Paraguayan courts through executive branch domination establishes inef-
fective local remedies and consequent waiver of the normal requirement.120
Thus, the analysis under the two doctrines indicates contrary results.
B. A MODEST PROPOSAL
All legal systems contain two primary yet somewhat inconsistent
115. The Second Circuit indicated in dictum in Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), that an individual could never sue his own state
for a violation of international law. If followed by other courts, this category of potential
conflict between forum non conveniens and the domestic remedies requirement would be elim-
inated. The court's statement, while following the classic view of international law, violates
the original intent of section 1350 and should be abandoned. See text accompanying notes 28-
29 & 35-39 supra.
116. No. 79-6090 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1979) (action dismissed), appeal dockeled, (2d Cir.
June 4, 1979) For the facts of the case, see notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text,
117. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) ("The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial."); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 445, 455 (D. Del. 1978) (plaintiff represented by affidavit that Ecuador, the alternative
forum, "is presently controlled by a military government which has 'assumed the power of the
executive and legislative branches and rules by flat,' 'has specifically retained the right to veto
or intervene in any judicial matter which the Military Government deems to involve matters of
national concern,' and 'has absolute power over all branches of government.'" (footnote omit-
ted)).
118. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
119. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
120. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
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goals-uniformity and fairness. 12 1 Because the local remedies doctrine bet-
ter accomodates both of these goals than does forum non conveniens, the
former doctrine should be preferred over the latter when the two theories
conflict.' 22 Forum non conveniens lacks uniformity in two senses.' 23 By
contrast, the local remedies rule developed as an international law doctrine,
which means that it applies equally to all states. Courts and commentators
agree on most aspects of the doctrine's implementation. 124 Because of this
history, the domestic remedies rule would better promote uniformity than
forum non conveniens.
The forum non conveniens doctrine explicitly balances several conven-
ience and fairness factors in deciding upon the appropriateness of an alter-
native forum.' 25 The local remedies rule, however, does not forsake
fairness considerations in its application. The policies underlying the local
remedies rule and its exceptions suggest considerations similar to forum
non conveniens factors.' 26 Moreover, the exhaustion of local remedies doc-
trine tacitly assumes that the state where the claim arose generally repre-
sents a fairer and more convenient forum in which to initially adjudicate
the action than an international tribunal. If not, the doctrine provides the
"ineffectiveness" and "administrative practice" exceptions.
Other independent considerations also favor exhaustion of local reme-
dies analysis over forum non conveniens. One CulfOil factor--difficulty in
applying law foreign to the forum 127-- evaporates for international law is-
sues. Both fora are equally qualified to decide the relevancy of interna-
tional law in the particular case. As one commentator has remarked, "[tihe
forum non conveniens approach may not be very useful for international
law issues. . . . [A] single-minded approach might be more acceptable as
applied to international law than to foreign law."128
121. The Supreme Court has remarked that as to international law, various constitutional
and statutory provisions (including 28 U.S.C. § 1350) reflect "a concern for uniformity in this
country's dealings with foreign nations. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
122. For discussion of those rare cases where forum non conveniens analysis is a better tool
to achieve these goals, see text accompanying notes 133-35 infra.
123. See text accompanying notes 82-109 supra.
124. Disagreement exists, however, concerning the standard to be used in determining inef-
fectiveness. See note 58 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra. See also Blair, supra note 2, at 25-27
(unfairness in removing state's own citizen to foreign forum as one factor to consider).
126. See text accompanying notes 48, 50 & 58-61 supra. These exceptions indicate that the
local remedies rule applies only when it is fair to do so.
127. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
128. Saltzburg, Discovering and Applying Foreign and International Law in Domestic Tribu-
nals: An Introduction to the SecondAnnual Sokol Colloquium, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 609, 615-16
(1978).
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Finally, the local remedies rule embodies considerations of interna-
tional comity that forum non conveniens, because of its development in
domestic law, lacks. In its traditional context, the former doctrine reflects
more sensitivity to maintaining stable international relations by explicitly
recognizing a state's need to remedy international law violations committed
within its borders without undue international repercussions.' 2 9 Analysis
under the latter doctrine, dependent upon the various factors different
courts emphasize in their forum non conveniens analysis, achieves this goal
only haphazardly. Such fortuities will occur even less frequently when a
plaintiff brings suit in his own forum.' 30
Under this proposed analysis, the federal courts should allow the Filar-
tigas to continue their action in the United States. Other courts adopting an
exhaustion of local remedies analysis would uniformly apply the traditional
futility exception to the rule based on the Paraguayan government's domi-
nation over the judiciary.13 1 The fairness policies underlying the excep-
tions to the local remedies rule also indicate retention of federal
jurisdiction, 3 2 even though the U.S. court may be slightly inconvenienced
by another case on its docket, and the defendant would much prefer the
"safety" of Paraguayan courts. Cases may occur, however, in which forum
non conveniens analysis would be the proper approach to follow. Those
cases would be ones in which no act connecting the state, even under color
of law, exists. For example, suppose a citizen of state X sues a citizen of
state Yin federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, alleging a tort oc-
curring in state X. All the defendant's supporting witnesses reside in state
Y. No pertinent evidence appears to be in state X, and no state involve-
ment is alleged. The defendant moves to dismiss the case on a forum non
conveniens motion. What result? Without state involvement, many of the
traditional policy reasons behind the local remedies requirement break
down. Whatever the result, the court's decision will not affect international
relations. Thus, fairness to the parties is the key concern. The local reme-
dies rule considers these fairness goals, but only implicitly.' 33 By contrast,
American analysis of the forum non conveniens doctrine explicity places
these factors in the limelight of consideration.' 34 Therefore, forum non
129. See text accompanying notes 49 & 52 supra.
130. For a discussion of U.S. courts' reluctance to subject a U.S. plaintiff to a foreign
forum, see text accompanying notes 94-96 supra. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying
text for a similar pro-English plaintiff bias in English courts.
131. See, e.g., Brown Case (United States v. Great Britain), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 120, 129
(1923).
132. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
133. See id.
134. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
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conveniens analysis appears preferable in resolving dismissal issues in such
cases. 135
CONCLUSION
Domestic courts act as unofficial agents of both the political institu-
tions of the particular state and the international legal order.1 36 Addition-
ally, all judicial systems strive to attain the goals of uniformity and fairness.
These confficting demands exert pressures upon domestic courts that may
result in confusion and inconsistency in cases applying international law. A
proper understanding of the forum non conveniens and exhaustion of local
remedies rules will promote a policy-oriented approach to international
claims in domestic courts. In most of these cases, courts will better achieve
uniformity and fairness by abandoning forum non conveniens analysis.
Exhaustion of local remedies, a true international law doctrine, offers a bet-
ter judicial tool for the implementation of both national and international
legal orders.
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr*
135. A more uniform treatment of the fairness factors would enhance the effectiveness of
this proposed approach. For discussion of the confusion in U.S. courts, see text accompanying
notes 85-102 supra. Even given this confusion, however, U.S. courts' analysis, because it
explicitly lists the appropriate factors, seems preferable over the turmoil in English courts.
While the House of Lords' decision in MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., [19781 A.C. 795,
indicates a more liberal attitude toward allowing stays to foreign fora, the Lordships varied in
choice of criteria by which to determine when to stay an action. See id. at 812 (Lord Diplock
considering relative expenses and convenience to the parties and witnesses); id. at 819-20 (Lord
Salmon inconsistently urging both a test derived from a court's sense ofjustice (undefined) and
a standard dependent upon a defendant's proof of injustice to himself); id. at 829 (Lord Keith,
distinguishing cases where England is the "natural" forum from those where it is not). The
profusion of proposed tests in MacShannon recalls the old Scottish proverb that "[m]any a
mickle makes a muckle." Id. at 814 (Lord Diplock).
136. Lillich, supra note 4, at 47.
* The author wishes to thank Professor John F. Murphy of the University of Kansas
Law School for his editorial assistance in the preparation of this Note.
As this Note went to press, the Second Circuit rendered its decision in
Filartiga v. Pena, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980). In reversing the
district court's dismissal, the court held that official torture violates the law
of nations and, hence, satisfies the section 1350 jurisdictional prerequisite.
Id., slip op. at 3913, 3937. The court rejected its prior dictum that individu-
als cannot sue their own states under section 1350 as "clearly out of tune"
with current practice. Id. at 3929. While accepting the basic test for deter-
mining violations of the law of nations, the court warned against static
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interpretations of issues states may deem important to their interrelation-
ships. Id. at 3938. The opinion's broad interpretation of section 1350 may
signal a return to the statute's original intent. The Second Circuit did not
reach the "critical question" of forum non conveniens, and defendant's mo-
tion on that issue will be heard on remand. Id. at 3941. As discussed in this
Note, defendant Pena might also assert the defense of exhaustion of local
remedies.
